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Destined to Fail? The History of the Yen Bloc 
before the Second World War
Woosik Moon
The formation of yen bloc did not result in the economic and monetary integration of
East Asian economies. Rather it led to the increasing disintegration of East Asian
economies. Compared to Japan, Asian regions and countries had to suffer from higher
inflation. In fact, the farther the countries were away from Japan, the more their central
banks had to print the money and the higher their inflations were. Moreover, the income
gap between Japan and other Asian countries widened. It means that the regionalization
centered on Japanese yen was destined to fail, suggesting that the Co-prosperity Area was
nothing but a strategy of regional dominance, not of regional cooperation. The impact was
quite long lasting because it still haunts East Asian countries, contributing to the
nourishment of their distrust vis-à-vis Japan, and throws a shadow on the recent monetary
and financial cooperation movements in East Asia. This experience highlights the
importance of responsible actions on the part of leading countries to boost regional
solidarity and cohesion for the viability and sustainability of regional monetary system. 
1. Introduction
There is now a growing literature that argues for closer monetary and financial cooperation in
East Asia, reflecting rising economic and political interdependence between countries in the
region. If such a cooperation happens, leading countries should assume corresponding
responsibilities. For, the viability of the system depends on their responsible actions to boost
regional solidarity and cohesion. Indeed, the historic experience of the past yen bloc shows that,
given the absence of responsibilities of Japan, then the single most leading country, in
maintaining the system, the so called “Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” created by the imperial
Japanese government should fail. 
This paper examines the process of the formation and dissolution of the yen bloc during the
period of 1937~45 and intends thereby to highlight the importance of regional cohesion for the
viability and sustainability of regional monetary system. In fact, the yen block started with the
worldwide trend of regionalization during the 1930s depression. As a response to the
regionalization, Japan intended to create its own bloc devoid of Western influence and on the
basis of autarky. This idea gained the momentum with the start of the Sino-Japanese War in
1937. As the war was soon extended into the Pacific War and most of the East Asian countries
were transformed into a set of colonies, satellites or occupied territories of Japan, Japan proposed
the so called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere with the yen bloc as the basic principle
regarding money and finance in East Asia. More precisely, the yen bloc can be defined similarly
to the sterling bloc. Sterling area means two things. “In the first place, the sterling countries keep
their exchange rats fixed in relation to the pound. Secondly they hold their external exchange
reserves partly and wholly in sterling in the form of bank balances or short term investment in
London”[League of Nations(1936)]. Interpreted in this way, East Asia during the World War II
period was under the yen bloc, because the Japanese yen was the official anchor and at the same
time other Asian countries than Japan had to hold yen balances. To this end, Japanese attempted
“to divide the occupied regions into a number of appropriate districts in conformity with the
administrative systems, and to let each district have its own system of note issuing central banks,
the currencies issued by such institution being the only legal tenders of the respective districts
and their value standards based on the Japanese yen”[The Oriental Economist(1942)]. 
The studies on the yen bloc were carried out mostly by Japanese authors[Kobayashi(1975),
Shimazaki(1989)]. For instance, Shimazaki described the history of yen bloc as the history of
invasion of Japanese yen. Iwatake focused on the competition and conflicts in China between
different Japanese and Chinese currencies during the Second Sino-Japan War. Their main
objectives were, however, to explain the history of the yen bloc from Japan’s viewpoint and thus
they did not pay enough attention to the monetary and financial difficulties experienced by other
Asian countries. The question of regional cohesion and solidarity was either neglected or
insufficiently addressed. Apart from these studies, there are also quite many studies describing
the monetary and financial situation of many other Asian countries during the Japanese
colonization period from their own perspective[Young(1965a), Banyai(1974), Bae(1990)]. For
instance, Young traces out the historic development of Chinese monetary system minutely,
collecting invaluable data and statistics on money, price and exchange rate in China. Banyai
provides quite a comprehensive survey on money and banking in China and Southeast Asia
during the period 1939~45. Bae focuses on monetary development of Korea during the colonial
period. These studies could be used to understand the monetary developments and disarray in
many Asian countries and regions caused by the Japanese attempts to extend the yen bloc.
This paper argues that the formation of yen bloc did not result in the economic and monetary
integration of East Asian economies. Rather it led to the increasing disintegration of East Asian
economies (refuting the endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area). This is clear from the fact
that the gap in inflation rate and income level between Japan and other East Asian countries
widened during the Japanese occupation period. That experiment was frustrating for Asian
countries. It means that the regionalization centered on Japanese yen was destined to fail,
suggesting that the Co-prosperity was nothing but a simple propaganda of Japan. The impact was
quite long lasting because it still haunts East Asian countries, contributing to the nourishment of
their distrust vis-à-vis Japan, and throws a shadow on the recent monetary and trade cooperation
movements in East Asia. This explains why ideas about regional monetary cooperation could
rarely be heard of until the eruption of Asian currency crises. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the formation process of the yen
bloc is described. In Section 3, the features of the yen bloc are examined together with its
enlargement. In Section 4, the consequences of the yen bloc are investigated. 
2. The Formation of Yen Bloc
Well before the formation of Yen bloc, silver dollar played a pivotal role in linking many
countries in East Asia and the world. Since the 16th century, Western silver coins including
Spanish and Mexican dollars have been widely used in China, Japan and other East Asia. These
imported silver dollars were standardized in form, weight and finesse, and thus convenient. They
soon became the media of exchange, replacing Chinese tael(liang) as the unit of account in East
Asian monetary system, and were given a name yuan (according to Chinese pronunciation), yen
(according to Japanese one) and won (according to Korean one).(1) Thus, there was already a
natural currency zone in East Asia with silver dollar as unit of account. What Japan tried to
accomplish with its idea of Yen bloc was nothing but to impose its own political and economic
order to other East Asian counties on the basis of the military power. Naturally, the formation of
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(1) Yuan, yen and won all means “round”, because, unlike traditional Chinese and East Asian coins,
Western coins were round without any rectangular hole in the center.
the yen bloc goes along with the Japanese military occupation of Asian countries.
2.1. First Step
Japan was the first nation to modernize and successfully resist Western political and economic
encroachments. Thus, Japan could have served as a model and aspiration to anti-colonial
movements throughout Asia. Betraying this aspiration, however, Japanese leaders developed the
same ambition as those of Western imperialist states and joined the global trend toward
territorial expansion and colonialism. In the early 20th century, Japan acquired its first colonial
territories in Korea and Manchuria. 
The idea for the yen bloc started with the colonization of these territories. The first Japanese
bank that opened its business in Korea was the First Bank, established in 1873. Paralleling the
deepening influence of Japan on Korea since the victory of Sino-Japanese war, the First Bank
increased its business in Korea including the Korean government’s finance and note issuing. In
particular, to cope with chaotic monetary situation characterized by the circulation of numerous
coins of different weights and standards, the First Bank was officially charged with harmonizing
different currency standards and authorized to issue its own bank notes in Korea. To this end the
Bank was allocated the maximum limit for the issuance of its notes, and at the same time, had to
back up its issue by government securities and commercial papers as fiduciary reserves, let alone
gold, silver and Japanese yen as specie reserves. After the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, Korea
was declared a Japanese protectorate and then a colony, and at the same time the note issuing
business of the First Bank came to be transferred to the newly created central bank, Bank of
Chosun.(2) It is to note it was mostly the Japanese yen that was served as its reserve assets in
issuing the notes of the First Bank and later of the Bank of Chosun, which exchanged at par with
Japanese yen. In this sense, Korea was considered as the first country in East Asia that adopted
the yen standard system, which would constitute the core principle of Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere in monetary affaires[Shimazaki(1989)].
2.2. Manchuria and China
After the annexation of Korea, China would become a next candidate for Japanese
expansionism because of its abundant resources and huge market potential. It did not start
immediately, however. The Great Depression and the dislocation of world economy led to the
(2) Chosun is the old name for Korea.
emergence of new nationalism and militarism in Japan, accentuating Japan’s desire for regional
integration and domination. Also, it pushed Japan for revoking the belated return to gold
standard, which was decided on January 11, 1930. The re-suspension of the gold standard,
however, does not mean the floating system, because Japanese government tried to maintain the
exchange rate constant by the operation of the Exchange Stabilization (Equalization) Fund in the
hand of government or by directly regulating demand itself for foreign exchange. Moreover,
Foreign Exchange Control Act was put in force on May 1, 1933, concentrating all demands and
supplies for foreign exchange into Government accounts.(3)
In 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria and soon established the new puppet government
Manchukuo. Japan started the unification of currencies in Manchuria. There was a
heterogeneous mixture of coins, weights, and paper money with their values fluctuating widely
with each other. There were 15 different paper monies issued by provincial bank or currency
bureaus. There was also a discussion on the currency standard. The reason was that the
fluctuations in exchange rates due to the conflict between silver standard system and gold
standard harm the regular business, causing lots of losses for the Japanese merchants, nourishing
speculation. At the same time, the Central Bank of Manchuria was established at Shingking in
1935. The currency of Manchuria was linked to and exchangeable at par with the Japanese yen. 
It is important to note that by integrating Manchuria to Chosun-Japan on monetary and
economic affairs, Japan joined the world-wide trend of creating economic blocs, which
developed later into the idea about Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Bloc. Given that the
world had already seen appearing a sterling bloc centered on the UK and its Commonwealth and
a dollar bloc centered on the US, it implies that the world was entering into the era of closed and
self-sufficient economic blocs, replacing the era of international cooperation represented by
Washington conference system[Shimazaki(1989)].
The Marco Polo Incident took place on July 7, 1937, bringing Japan again into a war against
China. The Second Sino-Japanese war snowballed of its own volition and finally the battle fronts
extended over entire China, north from the Russian border to Central and south China. As Japan
was in control of new areas, the management of newly occupied areas became urgent. So there
followed the establishment of the Inner Monglia Bank (located at Kalgan), Chinese Federal
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(3) Moreover, the exchange rate was pegged either against London 1 shilling 2 pence per 1 yen or
against New York 23 dollars and 1/16 cents per 100 yen or to both. 
Reserve Bank (located at Peking) and Central Reserve Bank (located at Shanghai). Table 1
summarizes this movement. 
Japan established the Inner Mongolia Bank at Kalgan on December 1 1937. This bank was
authorized to issue banknotes, which were linked to the Japanese yen and Manchukuo Yuan at
parity, and to handle the fiscal business of the puppet government and the public funds of the
various local public bodies.
On March 10, 1938, the Federal Reserve Bank opened its business in Peking as the central
banking institution for North China. The banknotes of the Federal Reserve Bank of China were
linked to the Japanese yen and to Manchukuo Yuan at par, and, temporarily, linked to the
National Yuan (or Fapi(4) in Chinese (CN$)) of the Free China. De jure, its banknotes were
backed by gold and silver and foreign currencies up to 40% or more of those issued.(5)
It is to note that at this time, Japanese yen was rapidly attaining the status of a key currency
country similar to the US and its dollar in the Western Hemisphere. The Japanese yen was
identified with the industrial and political strength of Japan[Banyai(1974)] and Japanese yen
<Table 1> Yen Bloc in the Occupied China
Issuing Bank
Authorizing Date of Exchange Circulation
Government creation Rate Area
National Central Bank Manchuria 
Yuan of Manchuria Government
July 1, 1932 Par with yen Manchukuo
Yuan Note
Inner Mongolia Self-Gorverning November 1, 
Bank Mongolia Government 1937
Par with yen Inner Mongolia
Yuan Note
Federal North China March 10, North China, 
Reserve Bank Committee 1938
Par with yen
Sandong, Sansu,
Central Reserve Government January 6, 
18 yen against
Yuan Note Bank at Nanking 1941
100 yuan
Central China





Source: Y. M. Bae(1990).
(4) Fapi in Chinese means literally “legal tender.”
(5) The capital of this bank was subscribed by puppet government provided by the loan made by
Yokohama specie bank, Bank of Chosun and Industrial Bank of Japan.   
linked currencies such as the notes of Bank of Japan, Bank of Chosun and Central Bank of
Manchukuo were widely circulating together with the Fapi, National Yuan (CN$) notes issued
by the National Government of Free China (KMT government). The Japanese military forces in
North China initially used these currencies, especially the notes of Bank of Chosun, for their
military expenditures. However, faced with the devaluation of these notes due to the over-
printing, which made Japanese concerned with the devaluation of the Japanese yen linked to
them, Japan decided to replace these notes by the notes of the newly created FRB of China,
establishing its notes as the sole legal tender in North China.
Japan at the same time prohibited the circulation of the Fapi notes (CN$) of the National
Government of Free China. In North China, however, the Fapi banknotes remained firmly in
circulation (especially in those occupied areas outside of Japanese control), and the notes of FRB
did not dominate at all the circulation. The Fapi notes continued to circulate in competition with
the notes of FRB. In fact, the Fapi was a secure and readily accepted currency for which people
had confidence. The notes of the FRB of China were new and people were reluctant to accept it.
Moreover, though the occupied area was immensely spacious, what Japanese army really put
under control were cities and railways only, as signified by points and lines. It made it very
complicated for the stationed Japanese armies to self-supply war materials. Even the Japanese
were forced to obtain and use the Fapi notes to purchase the needed commodities from the
country area. The National Government of Free China led the currency war against Japan at its
advantage. The reason was that although it was linked to Japanese yen at par, the FRB note was
inconvertible (no clause regarding the specie resumption). Thus its value had to be maintained
by the exchange operations but its rate of exchange into foreign currency was fixed at too high a
figure. To protect the value of the notes of the FRB of China, Japan had nothing but to rely on
the comprehensive measures of trade and exchange control.
Similar developments ensued for Central China. As Central China fell under the Japanese
occupation, Japan decided to establish Central Reserve Bank of Chin as a central banking
institution for Central and South China. It opened its business on January 1941, taking over the
business of the Hua Hsing Bank. Unlike in the case of North China, where Japanese military
army used the note of Bank of Chosun, Japanese army in Central China used the yen notes of the
Bank of Japan initially for its military outlays. As the amount of Japanese yen notes in
circulation was becoming larger and larger, however, its value dropped and the Japanese yen
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was transacted at a discount with regard to other currencies. Many of these yen notes flowed
back to Japan and upset the monetary management of Japan. Japan were concerned about
continuing devaluation of the Japanese yen. To prevent the use of these yen notes back in Japan,
Japan decided to withdraw the Bank of Japan yen notes from circulation in Central China and to
substitute in their stead military scripts or military notes to finance its military spending.
Although these military notes were denominated in yen and fixed at par with the Japanese yen,
they were inconvertible to the yen and prevented from circulating in Japan and other areas.(6) As
a matter of fact, almost all Japanese yen linked currencies including the military notes were
neither convertible into the note of the Bank of Japan nor into foreign currencies due to the
exchange control. The value of the military notes vis-à-vis the Fapi, National Yuan of the
National Government of Free China, varied widely from time to time and from place to place.
The circulation remained limited, although it was enforced on many occasions by the military
forces of Japan. Thus, similarly to the FRB of China, Japan decided to replace the military notes
by the notes of the Central Reserve Bank of China. The value of the CRB notes was fixed at the
rate of 18 yen against 100 yuan. Issuing the CRB yuan notes, Japan made it as the sole legal
tender in Central China and banning all the circulation of the Fapi notes. The redemption of the
Fapi with CRB yuan notes was made at the exchange rate of 2 to 1 (CN2$ = CRB1yuan). Also
Japan undertook to withdraw the military notes on the condition that it would support the
military outlays of Japan.
But to keep the exchange rate of the CRB notes stable turned out a heavy burden for the
Japanese. In order to maintain it, the exchange control had to be reinforced gradually more
strictly until at last all trade and foreign exchange transactions became impossible
2.3. Currency War between China and Japan
In the late 1920s as a result of imperialist rivalries and nationalist movements, the National
Government of Free China (KMT) was able to bring nominal political unity to China after
decades of war politics. In fact, the National Government could assume nationwide
responsibility in 1928. It immediately recognized the urgency of economic and financial
rehabilitation. Recognizing the need for a modern financial system, the new government created
the Central Bank of China on October 6, 1928, which was to be reorganized as a true central
(6) These military notes were overprinted on yen note in large red characters denoting for military use
only.
bank. The bank was given the right to issue its own notes, to mint and circulate coins, to deal in
foreign exchanges and to handle issuance and service of public loans. Notes were to have a
reserve of 60% in silver or gold coin or bullion and 40% in government bonds or commercial
paper.
Yet monetary situation remained chaotic until the currency reform in 1935. The currency
consisted of money of endless variety, differing place to place. The first step in monetary reform
was the coinage reform, abolishing the tael as unit of account and introducing standard silver
dollar, named yuan.(7) The second step took place in November 1935. The reform of 1935
nationalized silver and made notes of the Central Bank of China, Bank of China, and Bank of
Communications full legal tender (Fapi) for all obligations in terms of silver. The exchange rate
of the Fapi was fixed equal to 1 shilling 2 pences per 1 yuan. Also it created a Currency Reserve
Board to control note issue and keep custody of note reserves. Use of silver as currency was
forbidden, and prices were in Fapi, the sole legal tender, with a managed and stable foreign
exchange standard[Young(1965b, p. 166)]. 
Because printing the banknotes was a major source of government finance for Japanese army
as well as Nationalist Chinese Government, who faced up with continuing Japanese aggression,
it turned out essential for wining the war between each other to win the currency war in which
National Yuan (Fapi) and the currencies of Japanese sponsored banks competed with each other
for stability and acceptability. As China managed to maintain independent management currency
system, Fapi came to be supported by the UK and US, while the value of FRB and CRB notes by
Japan.
To maintain the value of the Fapi, an Anglo-Chinese Exchange Stabilization Fund was set up
on April 1939 with a capital of 10 million pound. Soon after its establishment, however, the
Fund was faced with serious pressure. This is largely due to the flight of domestic capital and
from Japanese purchases of foreign exchange with the Fapi obtained in the occupied areas of
North China. Indeed, with the establishment of Federal Reserve Bank in North China, the
Japanese withdrew the Fapi notes from circulation, replacing them with the notes of FRB, and
used them at Shanghai foreign exchange market for the purchase of foreign exchange. It brought
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(7) Until then, much of China’s silver was in the form of silver ‘shoes or sycee whose weight was
expressed in taels (liang), and in bars. The tael was a unit of account. However, the tael’s weight
varied from place to place, sometimes within an area for different transactions.
about a depreciation pressure on the Fapi. In the spring of 1940, the market condition became
unfavorable once more and the Exchange Stabilization Fund had to withdraw from the market
due to the establishment of Central Reserve Bank in Central China by the Japanese puppet
government at Nanking. Thus to support the value of the Fapi, the National Government of Free
China had to rely on foreign help again. This time, the help came from the US. On April 25,
1941, the Stabilization fund of the US Treasury agreed to grant $50 million to the Chinese
Stabilization fund for the purpose of stabilizing the value of Fapi in relation to the US dollar. At
the same time, the British Treasury made a further contribution equivalent to L5 million to
support the National Yuan in terms of sterling.
The maintenance of the free exchange market at Shanghai and the support of the Chinese
currency by the Fund were to some extent inevitable for the stability of Fapi. Two reasons could
be mentioned in this regard. In the first place, it was partly the very existence of a free market
and of the possibility of conversion which it implied, that rendered the population of the
occupied areas reluctant to give up their Chinese currency in exchange for the inconvertible
currencies introduced by the Japanese puppet governments. It is reported that even in North
China large amounts of Chinese notes remain in circulation or in hiding in spite of the severe
penalties and prohibitions decreed by the Japanese authorities. Secondly, the existence of a
reasonably stable exchange market tended to support the whole system of internal Government
finance in free China. It helped to maintain a certain level of confidence in the currency and to
check the flight into commodities on the part of the public.
Despite the currency war for stability, both the currencies of National Government of Free
China and Japanese puppet Chinese governments circulated in parallel and China was plagued
by hyper-inflation because the long lasting Sino-Japanese war necessitated ever increasing
money printing for both governments. (See Table 4 below)
3. Yen Bloc under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
3.1. Establishment of the Great East Asia Financial Sphere 
The continual expansion by Japan into China led to deepening hostilities, especially between
Japan and US. To check the military expansionism of Japan, the US prohibited its export of
aluminum and scrap iron to Japan, froze Japanese assets in America and imposed a total
embargo on oil exports to Japan. However it did not stop Japan from indulging in military
expansionism into the South East Asia, paving the way toward the Pacific war, which finally
broke out in 1941. 
With its invasion into South East Asia, Japan set up more comprehensive policy regarding
regional order under the slogan of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which was to include
not only Japan, China and Manchukuo but also the South Sea Area including French Indo-China,
Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Philippines and Dutch East Indies. In fact, this Japanese idea was
nothing but the prolongation of the New Order in East Asia announced by Foreign Minister
Konoye on November 3, 1938, just after the outbreak of Sino-Japanese war. The concept of this
New Order entailed the establishment of political and economic interdependence and mutual aid
among the nations of Japan, Manchukuo and China. Japanese pointed out that such a union
would take its place among the other blocs of Western powers, resisting their aggressive
advances. Japan hoped that it would have ended Japan’s dependence on the Western powers for
its raw materials for Japanese industry too. Asia for Asians was another catchword. South Sea
Area was essential to Japan as a source of raw materials such as coal, rice, iron, rubber and tin
and in this respect fit in well with Japan’s plan for Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
As Japan replaced the US and the European powers as the new imperialist state, the Pan-Asian
idea was transformed into the propaganda under the name of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. The German parallel was “Lebensraum.”(8)
“We must show the races of East Asia that the order, tranquility, peace, happiness, and contentment of
East Asia can be gained only by eradicating the evil precedent of the encroachment and extortion of the
Anglo-Saxons in East Asia, by effecting the real aim of the co-prosperity of East Asia, and by making
Japan the leader of East Asia.”
Immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 1941, Japan established
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(8) The lebensraum (“living space”) was a popular political slogan during the establishment of a united
Germany in 1871. At this time, Lebensraum usually meant finding additional “living space” by
adding colonial territories. Hitler changed the concept of Lebensraum. Rather than adding colonies to
make Germany larger, he wanted to enlarge Germany within Europe. Especially Hitler looked east
for Germany’s expansion in Europe. The Nazi modified theory of Lebensraum became Germany’s
foreign policy during the Third Reich. 
military administration in the occupied South East Asia (except for Indochina and Thailand), and
to self-supply and cover up the increasing military and administrative expenditures, used military
notes denominated in local currencies. These military notes were a general means of payment
and circulated together with the pre-occupation local currencies. Indeed, Japanese military forces
had already circulated a variety of military notes in yen issued exclusively for use in the
occupied Central and South China. This predates the Japanese military notes issued for use in the
South East Asia. However, the former is distinguished from the latter in the sense that it is
denominated in Japanese yen, which is exchanged at par with Japanese yen. The exchange rate
between the military notes denominated in local currencies of South East Asian countries and the
Japanese yen was not fixed until 1943, after which it was decided to be at par. Also, to handle
the military funds and to finance the long term development and construction of occupied, filling
the gap left by the closing of existing local banks controlled by former colonial states such as the
UK, Netherlands and the US, Japan created the Southern Development Cooperation in 1942.
However, as the military expenditures continued to increase and the inflation in the occupied
area is accelerating, this institution was allowed to issue its own notes and withdraw the military
notes from March 1943 and thereby was to be transformed into de facto central bank of issue.
The reason was that, to exploit the resources of the occupied area as much as possible, Japanese
government had to eliminate the local currencies from circulation and to substitute in their place
its own notes. (Similarly to South China) 
In fact, during the Pacific war, the goal of the Japanese plan for financial control in the
occupied areas was to establish its own Financial Sphere of Greater East Asia devoid of Western
influence and thereby to exploit the occupied areas. The main principle of Japanese plan for the
financial management of the Sphere was to use Japanese yen, for fixing the external value of the
currencies of the Sphere, for maintaining a managed currency system, and for settling foreign
exchange transactions in the Sphere, and thereby to eliminate old gold and silver standard or
exchange system based on the US dollar and UK sterling. Briefly Japan hoped to set up a
financial sphere with Tokyo as financial center, making yen as the anchor, reserve and settlement
currency for Greater East Asia. The feature of this financial sphere can be examined in more
detail as follows.
3.2. Features of Great East Asia Financial Sphere
3.2.1. Yen as a Anchor and the Par Link Policy 
To establish yen as the regional anchor currency, the currencies of the occupied areas became
linked at par with the Japanese yen. First in the case of the Bank of Chosun and the Bank of
Taiwan, it was stipulated in the law that their notes be convertible into Bank of Japan notes at par
without any reservation. Among Japan proper, Korea and Taiwan, there was no restriction of any
kind with regard to exchange, circulation and transactions. In the case of Central Bank of
Manchuria notes, the conversion was allowed nothing but for the travelers. As mentioned, this
step was taken to protect the value of yen from depreciating as the volume of money in
circulation and inflation rate were rising more rapidly in Manchukuo. In the case of the Bank of
Inner Mongolia and the Federal Reserve Bank notes, which were exchanged at par with the
Japanese yen, and in the case of the Central Reserve Bank notes, which were converted to
Japanese yen at a ratio of 18 Japanese yen to 100 Yuan, however, there was a strict exchange
control.
Since the outbreak of Pacific War in 1941, Japan abolished foreign exchange floatation in
terms of US dollars and UK pounds. The exchange markets vanished and the Japanese monetary
authorities had to decide directly the conversion rate between yen and other currencies on the
consideration of various elements such as productivity capacity, natural resources, standard of
living, etc. The conversion rate between yen and the currencies of the South East Asian countries
was set up to be at par, 1 to 1, except for French Indochina and Thailand, where the existing rates
of exchanges were available. Moreover, the exchange transactions with US and UK were
completely suspended and these were limited only to Germany and Italy as well as the countries
in the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. 
The par link of the currencies of South East Asian countries with Japanese yen implied that the
value of these currencies dropped by two-folds, thereby reducing the import price of Japan by
half compared with the level that prevailed in the prewar period and bring about the internal
circulation of goods in Japan’s favor. In fact, despite the fact that the conversion at par between
yen and local currencies was unrealistic, this was possible due to trade and exchange control by
the Japanese government. However, as the exchange rate became functionless as helping to
correct trade imbalances or inflation rate differentials between different areas in the Sphere, there
were lots of distortions and inefficiencies with the par link policy. Especially, as inflation
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differential with respect to Japan was accelerating in the occupied areas, Japanese government
had to reinforce its trade and capital control. For, the imports of Japan from these areas tended to
decline whereas the exports of Japan toward these areas increasing. (a hurdle for financing the
necessary commodities for war).
Japanese government resorted to two policy measures. One was to use the subsidy system. It
means that Japanese government charged the exporters as levy the differential between export
price and domestic price and provided the differential between import price and domestic price
as subsidy. The other was to use special conversion rate for Japanese imports. That is, importers
were compensated for their loss in imports, using s special conversion rate between yen and the
currencies of import areas.
3.2.2. Yen as a Reserve Currency
As mentioned, Japan established the central bank of issue or institutions of similar role in one
occupied area after another, when necessity arose. These institutions in the occupied areas were
subject to holding the reserves of the yen exchanges or the Bank of Japan notes. In fact, Bank of
Japan extended on its own account monetary loans and credits to the various central banks of the
Japanese controlled governments.(9) The borrowing central banks had to hold the proceeds of
loans as reserves on the books of the bank of Japan against their note issues. 
Even though the holdings of the yen by the central banks of the East Asian countries was
initially intended to raise the credit standings of the yen-linked currencies, Japan blocked the use
of the yen balances held by East Asian countries so as to exploit the local economies for the
increasing military spendings. The typical example was the introduction of the so-called Mutual
Deposit System (Balances), forcing other East Asian countries to hold the blocked Japanese yen
in return for their own local currencies. The Mutual Deposit System was first introduced
between Chosun Bank and Yokohama Specie Bank on the one hand, and Federal Reserve Bank
and Central Reserve Bank on the other hand, with the start of the Japanese occupation of China. 
3.2.3. Yen Based Settlement System
During the pacific war, Japan introduced a clearing system, with the international transactions
between nations being settled via transfers on the account of the central banks of the contracting
(9) They include Central bank of Manchukuo, Bank of Inner Mongolia, Federal Reserve Bank of China,
Central Reserve Bank of China, Banque de l’indochine, Central Bank of Thailand, Central Bank of
Burma and the proposed central bank of the Philippines.
countries. In fact, this clearing system was modeled after the German Nazi’s system, in contrast
to the then UK or US system that consisted of setting up an exchange stabilization fund and
intervening in the exchange market to fix the exchange rate[Shimazaki(1989)]. Japan concluded
many bilateral clearing contracts with the governments of the occupied and satellite areas. The
first of these clearing agreements was made between Yokohama Specie Bank and Java Bank in
December 1940. Since then, Yokohama Specie bank concluded 7 more contracts, with the Bank
Destined to Fail: The History of the Yen Bloc
<Table 2> Settlement System in East Asia
To
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of Chosun and Bank of Japan doing 1 contract respectively. In 1942, Japanese government
decided to make Bank of Japan as the leading central bank and clearing institution in the area
and the Bank of Japan Act was revised so as to implement the settlements between nations via
transfers in the special yen account that central banks of the occupied areas maintain in the form
of deposit at the Bank of Japan. Despite this attempt, however, the Bank of Japan could not
succeed in replacing the Yokohama Specie Bank, a special foreign exchange bank handling the
Japanese government account overseas, as the central clearing institution in the yen bloc area
and the settlement system remained fragmentary.
4. Consequences of the Yen Bloc: Increasing Divergence
Contrary to the propaganda of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, there were widening
economic disparities between Japan, its colonies and occupied areas. This increasing economic
divergence can be examined in two respects. One is the inflation gap and the other is the income
gap, which can be measured relying on the data collected by Maddison(1995).
4.1. Inflation Gap
During the Japanese occupation, East Asia was also plagued by high inflation, with each area
having its own system of note issuing bank and currency. It is noteworthy that compared to
Japan and its close colonies, the regions at long distance such as Central and South China and
South East Asian countries recorded relatively higher inflation. For instance, the inflation rate at
the eve of the defeat of Japan in 1945 in Tokyo was little more than two times as high that in
1937, but reached several thousand or ten thousand times in China and South East Asia.
In fact, Table 3 shows that the farther away the region in question was from Tokyo, the higher
seemed its inflation rate. Thus, there was also a widening inflation differential between Japan
and other East Asian countries.
This was because the use of the yen linked currencies was not voluntary but imposed on the
occupied regions. The occupied regions were especially obliged to meet the increasing Japanese
war expenses, and as a consequence, their local central banks, most of which would be
controlled by Japan, had to issue more and more the money. In fact, the farther the regions were
away from Japan, the higher was the increase in their money supply, paralleling the inflation rate
movement. This is clear from Table 4.
One important instrument that obliged the occupied East Asian countries to issue more and
more money was “the Local Borrowing System” introduced in 1943. Basically, the introduction
of this system was due to the fact that with the rapid rise of inflation in the occupied area,
occurred as a result of the increase in military spending, Japan had to procure ever more
increasing amount of the Japan-sponsored currencies to cover up its military spendings. Given
that the exchange rate of Japan sponsored currencies were fixed at par with Japanese yen,
however, it means that the issue of the Japanese yen would have to increase as well. To prevent
this situation, Japan decided to rely on the borrowings of local currencies, making use of the
Mutual Deposit System (as mentioned in the case of FRB and CRB notes), direct borrowing
agreement (the case of Central Bank of Manchuria notes) and the operation of Special Yen
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<Table 3> Movements of Wholesale Price Index in East Asia
China
Japan Taiwan Korea Manch- North Central Free Philippines Java Singapore Myanmar
uria China China China
Tokyo Taipei Seoul Shinking Beijing Shanghai Chungking Manila Batavia Langoon
1937. 12 100 100 100 100 100** 100 100
1938. 6 105 118 130 88 113
1938. 12 106 113 115 125 93 139
1939. 6 112 106 146 123 171
1939. 12 130 126 115 159 262 248 275
1940. 6 127 119 186 430 370 488
1940. 12 129 141 120 192 410 527 983
1941. 6 139 123 197 439 719 1365
1941. 12 146 147 125 208 518 1290 2322 100 100 100 100
1942. 6 150 151 128 212 646 2161 4183 140
1942. 12 151 151 132 235 817 3976 6965 200 134 352
1943. 6 161 160 142 241 1184 5944 11044 247 166 807 900
1943. 12 168 169 147 255 1382 14194 19826 1196 227 1201 1718
1944. 6 181 179 159 282 2156 46452 40696 5154 492 4469 3635
1944. 12 193 166 338 5901 202419 56348 14285 10766 8707
1945. 6 250 181 454* 15348* 2404919 177565 2421 30629
1945. 8 264 6967742 213913 3197 185648
Note: *: May, 1945.
**: As of the 1936.
Source: Shimazaki(1989), Young(1965a), Monthly Statistics of Chosun Bank, each issue.
Account (the case of Thai Baht and Indo-China Bank notes). In fact, this system helped Japanese
government to create as much local currencies as it wished. For instance, the use of the Mutual
Deposit accounted for more than 70% of the total money issued by the Central Reserve Bank
and was an important cause of inflation. 
Under this condition, the supply of the bank notes in the Occupied China was dependent on
the Japanese government’s order to balance with the increasing demand for money caused by
Japanese imperialist war. This system led to bring more inflation in the occupied China than
Japan and its close colonies such as Korea and Taiwan.(10) In turn, it touched off the hyper-
<Table 4> Note Issues by Different Japan Rated Banks and Central Bank of China (Million Yen or Yuan)
Japan Taiwan Korea China Southern Development Corporation(a) 
BOJ BOT BOC Free Phil Burma Malai Gulden TotalYen Yen Yen Manchu Mongol Federal Central China (Peso) (Rupee) Dollar(b) (c)
1937 2305 112 279 307 13 1639
1938. 6 2074 105 254 275 18 59 1727
1938. 12 2754 140 321 426 36 162 2305
1939. 6 2522 146 285 388 32 264 2700
1939. 12 3679 171 443 624 60 458 4287
1940. 6 3597 176 437 632 57 599 6063
1940. 12 4777 199 462 947 93 715 7867
1941. 6 4247 197 509 811 66 691 60 11296
1941. 12 5978 252 741 1262 114 964 237 15133
1942. 6 5545 250 667 1106 83 937 1172 22975 34 34
1942. 12 7418 289 908 1670 143 1581 3477 34360 106 137 149 83 463
1943. 6 7363 321 864 1800 176 1949 9122 49873 229 327 244 145 945
1943. 12 10266 415 1466 3011 379 3762 19150 75379 497 664 425 369 1955
1944. 6 12323 519 1817 3512 416 5995 38359 122779 1115 1544 752 803 4246
1944. 12 17745 796 3135 5877 1058 15841 139699 189461 4948 2774 1438 1464 10623
1945. 6 26181 1207 4376 2799a 55390 738273 397773 3147
1945. 8 42300 2285 7987 8800 3600 132603 2697231 556907 5656 5640 2792 19468
Source : Bank of Japan (1970), Young (1965a).
(a) Issued in local currency units but linked at par with Japanese yen.
(b) Issued for Malaysia, Singapore and Borneo.
(c) Issued for Java and Sumatra area.
(10) In Free China, National government of China was also obliged to issue its own money to finance the
war against Japan. For the detailed explanation, see Young(1965a).
inflationary spiral in the Fee China area, which was the most serious in Chinese history, because
the Nationalist Chinese Government (KMD regime) was also forced to finance the increasing
war expenses by issuing its currency.(11)
Moreover, for South-East Asian countries (except for Thailand and Indo-China), Japanese
military authorities themselves issued their own notes (military notes) in local units, although
they soon had to be replaced by the notes of Southern Development Corporation. Unlike central
banking institutions in other occupied areas, however, the Southern Development Corporation
had no maximum limit and no backing requirement for the note issue. Consequently, this region
had to suffer higher inflation.
4.2. Growth Gap
Not only in the monetary matters but also in terms of real income, the gap between Japan and
its neighboring countries widened. A. Maddison (1995) offers quite a comprehensive data for the
prewar period national income in some selected East Asian countries. Although incomplete and
sometimes very roughly estimated, it is the only available one that makes in common unit the
comparison of national income between countries during the period of Japanese expansion. It
will be thus useful enough to look at the changes of per-capital incomes of the East Asian
countries on the basis of his study.
Table 5 shows the trend of per capital GDP in different parts of East Asia relative to that of
Japan during the period 1910~1950. It suggests that the economic gap between Japan and its
colonies and occupied areas (measured in per capita GDP) has continued to be widened. For
instance, during the period 1913~1929, the per-capita incomes of Taiwan and Korea, Japan’s
colonies since 1895 and 1910 respectively, fell from 59% and 71% of Japanese per capita
income to 56% and 59%. This trend was temporarily suspended during the period 1929 to 1938.
During the war period 1938 to 1945, however, the decline in per capita incomes of Korea and
Taiwan relative to Japan resumed. This trend continued even after the end of the World War II.
As a result, for the period from 1913 to 1950, the relative per capita incomes of Korea and
Taiwan dropped from 59% and 71% of Japanese income to 46.8% and 49.2%. Even though the
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(11) The currency war with Japan intensified the internal contradictions of the Nationalist Chinese
Government regime, providing a good political space for the Communist to operate. Indeed, it led to
Communist revolution in 1949. In this sense, not only Japan but also China were losers of the
currency war. 
<Table 5> Per Capita GDP Relative to Japanese Income (%)
Year Japan China Korea Taiwan Indonesia Philippines Thailand Burma
1910 100 76.40 67.30
1911 100 68.87 67.64 67.71 43.10
1912 100 67.87 59.08 66.07
1913 100 51.57 71.06 59.52 68.74 106.30 63.42 47.60
1914 100 78.06 62.54 71.24
1915 100 81.16 58.47 66.33
1916 100 71.43 60.14 58.67 48.60
1917 100 73.66 63.42 57.43
1918 100 78.26 59.07 58.32
1919 100 69.00 56.77 56.94
1920 100 71.55 56.47 59.66
1921 100 68.14 50.42 54.44 36.78
1922 100 66.74 53.92 55.85
1923 100 68.41 55.26 56.81
1924 100 67.06 58.52 58.46
1925 100 64.77 57.39 58.16
1926 100 66.57 56.80 60.97 41.87
1927 100 69.54 55.31 64.42
1928 100 62.86 56.44 62.49
1929 100 39.97 59.72 56.80 61.93 80.25 41.00
1930 100 44.16 65.90 62.47 67.30 46.97
1931 100 44.57 64.31 60.63 63.12
1932 100 42.77 61.74 64.28 57.02
1933 100 39.23 64.20 54.31 51.37
1934 100 36.01 63.15 57.50 50.72
1935 100 38.33 69.61 63.24 50.69
1936 100 38.30 69.38 59.89 49.84 35.99
1937 100 36.06 75.48 57.97 51.86
1938 100 33.02 69.99 56.03 48.22 63.54 35.31 29.07
1939 100 53.89 52.01 41.49
1940 100 58.52 49.37 42.93
1941 100 59.66 52.75 44.36
1942 100 59.02 56.14 35.15
1943 100 59.21 37.25 29.59
1944 100 58.01 27.09 23.81
1945 100 53.05 57.76 39.69
1946 100 49.96 58.24 37.94
1947 100 49.06 60.93 41.09
1948 100 46.81 55.78 44.10
1949 100 47.83 53.26 46.79
1950 100 32.78 46.77 49.23 46.66 69.03 45.27 20.98
Source : Maddison(1995).
precise data for the income level during the war period is missing, the widening income gap
relative to Japan is quite the same for other occupied areas such as China and Southeast Asia.
For instance, China was not the colony but its sovereignty was limited by Japan (and Western
powers) until the defeat of Japan in 1945. Its per-capita income declined from 51% of the
Japanese in 1913 to 33% in 1938 and 32% in 1950. The same trend is true for Southeast Asian
countries. Given that until late 1930s Southeast Asian countries were not yet under Japanese
control, it was likely that the rising economic gap between Japan and these latter countries might
reflect the former colonial economic structure rather than the result of the Japanese occupation. It
is however still true that Japanese occupation of these countries did not bring about the co-
prosperity promised by Japan. In fact, as some observers put it, “the Japanese occupation caused
economic havoc in the so called liberated territories. The entire economic life of the region
regressed to the level of subsistence production and barter trade. The economic gulp has widened
between developed Japan and underdeveloped South East Asia.”
It means that even on pure economic ground the yen bloc doomed to failure, because the unity
of the bloc cannot be maintained in the face of widening diversities. In fact, after the military
defeat of Japan in World War II, most of the newly independent East Asian countries broke its
link to Japanese yen and adopted dollar standard system, while former British colonies such as
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia returned to the link of British Sterling until the breakdown
of the Sterling Area in the early 1970s. No single country in the region did want to remain in the
yen bloc. 
The exact reason why these countries were relatively more backward than Japan is very
difficult to know because the experience of these periods were very complex, compounded by
war and worldwide depression etc. But the growth performance during and after this period
suggest a hint about what might have happened in Asia if these countries had regained their
sovereignty. In fact, Japan achieved far faster growth than any other Asian countries, for instance
by earlier nation-building and westernizing its institutions. Other countries were late in these
efforts or at least prevented from doing so by Japan. After the defeat of Japan, however, other
East Asian countries could take off, starting the process of catch up with Japan. The catch up
was evident especially since the1970s.(12)
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(12) For instance, the per capita incomes of Korea and Taiwan in 1970 were respectively 23.3% and
24.4% of the Japanese income but since then they rose to 48.3% and 55.6% in 1990 and in 2000.
5. Conclusion
Japanese idea about the monetary management of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity
Sphere dates back to the integration of Korea and Manchuria to Japan. It is extended through the
Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Bloc to the idea of Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.
No matter how the idea developed, however, there was the same underlying objective: to exploit
the neighboring economies as much as possible to the sole benefit of Japan. In fact, the
experience of the Japanese invasion and occupation period shows that the economic and
inflationary gap between Japan and other East Asian countries continued to be widened. There
was no effort to fill the gap, showing the solidarity necessary for the maintenance of the bloc.
Rather, the other East Asian countries had to sacrifice their interests to support Japanese military
expansionism unilaterally. Indeed, it looks like that what Japan attempted to achieve was to
establish the hierarchical relation between the countries that dominate and are dominated. It
means that Japan pursued a strategy of regional dominance, not of regional cooperation. Clearly
it could not be acceptable to East Asian countries otherwise than on the basis of military forces.
Moreover, all these ideas were based on nationalism, which included exclusiveness and
closedness to the other parts of the world. It means that the so called Co-prosperity was nothing
but a Japanese propaganda.
The result was that after the Word War II, it took relatively very long time for Japan to
normalize its diplomatic relation with neighboring Asian countries. Even after the economic
relation with Japan became quite important, it helped these countries to distrust Japan, justifying
the reluctant attitude of East Asian governments toward Japan initiated ideas regarding regional
monetary and trade cooperation. In fact, the US emerged as the new and sole hegemonic power
in the region. Under American leadership, the postwar East Asian economy became much more
liberal, multilateral, and interdependent. This new world order led to an unprecedented
expansion of the East Asian and world economy, providing a good opportunity to fill the
economic gap that existed between East Asian countries and the US on the one hand and the
Japan on the other hand. This is another good reason why Japan initiative ideas about regional
cooperation received only a very lukewarm welcome in the region.
(12) Similar trend is observed for other East Asian countries.
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